With a new quarterly dataset we estimate a Bayesian Structural Autoregression model and a Fully Simultaneous System approach to analyze the macroeconomic effects of fiscal policy. Results show that positive government spending shocks, in general, have a negative effect on real GDP; lead to "crowding-out" effects of private consumption and investment; have a persistent and positive effect on the price level and a mixed impact on the average financing cost of government debt. Explicitly considering the government debt dynamics in the model is also important. A VAR counter-factual exercise confirms that unexpected positive spending shocks create relevant "crowdingout" effects.
Introduction
In the last twenty years, public spending control has been a major problem in Portugal. The gains from the drop in interest rates and, consequently, in the interest payments on the outstanding government debt were not accompanied by a sustained consolidation of public finances. Moreover, the episodes of fiscal improvement that occurred in the 1980s and in the 1990s have been short-termed and mostly not Therefore, given past performance and outcomes, it seems fair to say that after entering the European Union (EU) in 1986, joining the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) of the European Monetary System (EMS) in 1992 and entering EMU in January 1999, Portugal's fiscal track record could have been better.
In this context, the evaluation of the effects of fiscal policy on economic activity in Portugal becomes relevant and is the major goal of this paper. Additionally, we look at its impact on the composition of GDP, therefore, analyzing potential "crowding-out" effects on private consumption and private investment.
Fiscal policy shocks are identified using a recursive partial identification scheme 1 and we assess the posterior uncertainty of the impulse-response functions by estimating a Bayesian Structural Vector Autoregression (B-SVAR) model. We also account for the automatic response of fiscal policy to the economic activity, and use a Fully Simultaneous System approach in line with the works of Blanchard and Perotti (2002) , Leeper and Zha (2003) and Zha (1999, 2006) . In addition, we consider 3 the response of fiscal variables to the level of the government debt following Favero and Giavazzi (2007) and Afonso and Sousa (2009a) .
Another important contribution of the paper is the use of a set of quarterly fiscal data, which we build by drawing on the higher frequency (monthly) availability of fiscal cash data. This allows us to identify more precisely the effects of fiscal policy.
The findings of this paper can be summarized as follows. On the one hand, government spending shocks: (i) have a negative effect on real GDP; (ii) generate substantial "crowding-out" effects and lead to a fall in both private consumption and private investment; (iii) have a persistent and positive impact on the price level; and (iv) have mixed impacts on the average cost of refinancing the debt. Therefore, and from a policymaking perspective, increasing government spending does not emerge as an obvious instrument to help fostering economic activity.
On the other hand, government revenue shocks: (i) have a negative impact on GDP; (ii) crowd-out private consumption and private investment, although the response emerges with a lag of about four quarters; and (iii) is normally followed by a somewhat less disciplined fiscal policy.
The consideration of the feedback from government debt makes the effects of fiscal policy on (long-term) interest rates and GDP more persistent and these variables are also more responsive to the shocks. Moreover, the results do not seem to support the existence of a significant stabilizing response of the budget balance to the debt level. In fact, there is only weak evidence suggesting that: (i) government spending falls when the debt-to-GDP ratio is above its mean (in particular, in the period 1979:1-1993:3); and
(ii) government revenue increases when the debt-to-GDP ratio is above its mean (namely, in the period 1993:4-2007:4, shows that unexpected increases in government spending lead to important "crowdingout" effects.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section two reviews the related literature. Section three presents fiscal developments in Portugal. Section four explains the empirical strategies used to identify the effects of fiscal policy shocks. Section five describes the data and provides the empirical analysis. Section six concludes.
Literature Review
Despite the large literature on the impact of monetary policy on economic activity, the importance of fiscal policy for economic stabilization has received less attention. This section provides a brief review of the existing evidence of the effects of fiscal policy on GDP, the aggregate price level and the composition of output, that is, private consumption and private investment.
For the U.S., different approaches have been used in the identification of the fiscal policy shock. The "narrative approach" developed by Ramey and Shapiro (1998) isolates political events and finds that, after a brief rise in government spending, durables consumption falls while nondurable consumption displays a small decline. Fatás and Mihov (2001) use a Cholesky ordering and show that increases in government expenditures are expansionary, but lead to important changes in the composition of output in the form of an increase in private investment that more than compensates for the fall in private consumption. Blanchard and Perotti (2002) Giordano et al. (2007) find that government spending has expansionary effects on both output and private consumption for, respectively, Germany and Italy. Afonso and Sousa (2009a, 2009b) show that, for the U.S., the U.K., Germany and Italy, quarterly fiscal policy shocks have important macroeconomic effects while also impacting on housing and stock prices. In addition, Burriel et al. (2010) , using a quarterly standard SVAR, report that expenditure shocks are more persistent in the US than in the euro area, while the negative response from net tax increases is shorter lived in the euro area.
As can be inferred from the abovementioned studies, data availability -in particular, high frequency data -, remains a major drawback in the literature on fiscal policy. Therefore, we try to overcome this issue, by building also a fiscal quarterly dataset for Portugal. 6
Recent Fiscal Developments in Portugal
According to Afonso and Claeys (2008) Figure 1 ).
[ Figure 1 ]
After entering the EU in 1986, both inflation and interest rates in Portugal decreased steadily and converged towards the lower levels that were more common in other countries already in the EU. This was an obvious benefit from entering the EU, with capital markets adjusting expectations vis-à-vis Portugal, which also allowed for better and more stable sovereign debt ratings attributed to the country.
Regarding the past experiences in terms of fiscal consolidations, fiscal episodes can be identified based on the change in the cyclically adjusted primary budget balance.
For this purpose, Afonso (2010) determines for the EU countries the periods when the change in the primary cyclically adjusted budget balance is at least 2 percentage points (pp) of GDP in one year or at least 1.5 pp points on average in the last two years. For the case of Portugal, two episodes of fiscal expansion (1980) (1981) 2005 ) and three episodes of fiscal contraction can be reported (1982-83, 1986, and 1992) . The abovementioned fiscal consolidation episodes were, on the one hand shorttermed, and on the other hand mostly unsuccessful. During the 1982-83 consolidation both expenditures and revenues increased, as a share of GDP, while the debt-to-GDP ratio kept on increasing at the same time. 6 In the 1986 consolidation (the year of Portugal's entry in the EU), one observes a certain stabilization of revenues as a share of GDP, a decrease in the expenditure-to-GDP ratio, and also a decrease in the debt ratio in 8 the following three years. Additionally, the primary balance was also in surplus for the first time in thirteen years.
Finally, the 1992 episode was very short-termed, taking place in a difficult environment, following revenue and expenditure increases with the debt ratio rising immediately afterwards. 7 Moreover, the 1993 economic downturn in Europe did not play in favour of prolonging the consolidation, with the primary spending-to-GDP ratio increasing more significantly in that year. Indeed, a commonly known feature of fiscal policies in Portugal in the past has been the pro-cyclical behaviour of primary spending, which contributed to prevent the implementation of successful fiscal consolidations (see, for instance, Pina, 2004) . Such pro-cyclical behaviour would again be present in 2001, with the budget deficit going once more above the 3 per cent limit.
Modelling Strategies

The Bayesian Structural VAR
The first methodology used to analyze the macroeconomic effects of fiscal policy consists on the estimation of the following Structural VAR (SVAR)
9 where
is a matrix valued polynomial in positive powers of the lag operator L, n is the number of variables in the system, ε t is the fundamental economic shock, and v t is the VAR innovation. Equation (2) GDP, and the debt-to-GDP ratio at the beginning of the period t.
The specification follows Favero and Giavazzi (2007) in that we include the government debt dynamics, namely, by appending the non-linear budget identity to the VAR.
We use a recursive identification scheme and characterize fiscal policy as follows:
where, G t is the government primary spending, T t is the government revenue, f and g are linear functions, t  is the information set, and We assume that the variables in X t can be separated into 2 groups: (i) a subset of n 1 variables, X 1t (GDP, GDP deflator, consumption, investment, cost of debt), whose contemporaneous values appear in the policy function and do not respond contemporaneously to the fiscal policy shocks; and (ii) the policy variables in the form of government primary expenditure, G t , and/or government revenue, T t .
Therefore, the recursive assumptions can be represented by   This approach is also used by Christiano et al. (2005) in the context of identification of unexpected variation in monetary policy. Finally, we follow Sims and Zha (1999) and assess the posterior uncertainty about the impulse-response functions by using a Monte Carlo Markov-Chain (MCMC) algorithm.
The Fully Simultaneous System Approach
The second methodology used in the identification of fiscal policy shocks relies on a Fully Simultaneous System of Equations approach in a Bayesian framework.
We start by considering the structural VAR represented by (1), (2) and (3). The set of variables included in the system is
, G t , the government primary expenditures, T t , the government revenue, Y t , the GDP, P t , the GDP deflator, and i t , the average cost of debt financing.
The economy is divided into two sectors: a public and a production sector. The public sector -that allows for simultaneous effects -, comprises the equations for government primary spending and government revenue, and links them with the log real GDP, the GDP deflator, and the average cost of financing debt. The production sector consists of log real GDP, and the GDP deflator.
Additionally, we follow Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and Perotti (2004) , and assess the automatic response of taxes and government primary spending to economic 11 activity by computing the elasticity of government revenue and spending to macroeconomic variables.
The restrictions on the matrix of contemporaneous effects, Γ 0 , that allow us to identify the fiscal policy shock can be defined as 
where the parameters ij  represent the elasticity of the fiscal policy instrument i with respect to the macroeconomic variable j. Table 1 reports the elasticities used in the identification procedure. Finally, we use Bayesian inference to assess the posterior uncertainty about the impulse-response functions in the Fully Simultaneous system of equations as in Leeper and Zha (2003) , and Zha (1999, 2006) , and consider a Monte Carlo Importance Sampling Normalized Weights algorithm.
Empirical analysis
Data
This section provides a summary description of the data employed in the empirical analysis. A detailed description is provided in the appendix. All variables are in natural logarithms unless stated otherwise and the data covers the period 1978:1-
2007:4.
In the recursive partial identification scheme, the variables that are predetermined with respect to fiscal policy innovations are the GDP, private consumption, private investment, and GDP deflator. To these variables, we add the average cost of government debt financing (or the yield to maturity of long-term government bonds).
8 As measure of the fiscal policy instruments, we use either the government expenditures (and government revenues are included in X 1t ) or the government revenues (in which case, government expenditures are included in X 1t ).
In the Fully Simultaneous System approach, we restrict the set of variables to the GDP, GDP deflator, the average cost of debt financing and the fiscal policy instruments.
In both frameworks, we include a constant (or quarterly seasonal dummies), and the government debt-to-GDP ratio in the set of exogenous variables. All variables were deflated by the GDP deflator (2000=100). In addition, Figure 3 displays the observed debt-to-GDP ratio and the implicit debt-to-GDP ratio, that is, the one that emerges from the government debt's feedback.
As can be seen, the implicit series for the debt-to-GDP ratio tracks pretty well the actual series.
[ Figure 2] [ Figure 3] 8 The average government debt cost is obtained by dividing the net interest payments in t by the government debt at time t−1.
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Finally, the quarterly series of government spending and revenues are computed using the monthly Central Government's cash data.
Results
The Bayesian Structural VAR
We start by estimating a B-SVAR model that does not include the feedback from government debt, that is, where equation (2) is not considered. Then, we compare the results with the ones that emerge from estimating specifications (1), (2), and (3). [ Figure 4 ] Figure 4a displays the impulse-response functions of all variables in X t to a positive shock in government primary spending. In the case we do not include the debt feedback, it can be seen that government spending declines steadily following the shock, and the effect roughly vanishes after eight quarters. The effects on GDP are negative and reveal that government spending has a strong "crowding-out" effect on the private sector. In fact, both private consumption and private investment fall after the shock. In particular, a 6% shock in government spending leads to a 0.5% fall in GDP six quarters ahead. Similarly, private consumption falls by 0.6%, while the effects in private investment are more pronnounced (a fall of 1% at the horizon of six quarters).
These results are in line with the works of Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) and Alesina and 14 Ardagna (1998) who uncovered the presence of "non-Keynesian effects" (i.e., negative spending multipliers) during large fiscal consolidations.
In addition, there is a positive effect on the average cost of debt that reaches its peak after six quarters. The price level is also impacted persistently and positively by the shock in government spending. Finally, the results suggest that after a government spending shock, there is an increase in government revenue which is, however, small.
Therefore, this suggests that an expansion of government spending is associated with a episode of fiscal deterioration.
When we include the debt dynamics in the model, the effects of a government spending shock on the average cost of debt become somewhat larger while the impact on GDP is marginally smaller. Additionally, investment consistently falls much more than before and the positive impact on the price level is attenuated by the feedback from government debt. Figure 4b shows the impulse-response functions to a positive shock in government revenue. The results suggest that government revenue declines after the shock which erodes in about eight quarters. The effects on GDP, private consumption and private investment are slightly positive over the four quarters following the shock, but they quickly mean revert and become negative. In fact, a 5% shock in government revenue has its maximum impact on GDP (0.3%), private consumption (0.2%) and private investment (0.7%) at the four quarters horizon, after which the effects erode and change sign. These results are in accordance to the findings of Giavazzi et al. (2000) who show that a rise of taxes can have a positive impact on private consumption in periods of fiscal consolidation. In contrast, the price level falls for about four quarters, then recovers, and becomes positive. This evidence is closely related to the reaction of government spending, which increases after the shock. In fact, an increase in government revenue is followed by a somewhat less disciplined fiscal policy and, as a result, there is a deterioration of the fiscal balance. This also seems to be the reason for the positive impact on the average cost of debt, implying that the authorities should be aware of such market reactions when implementing fiscal policy.
In terms of the forecast error-variance decomposition of the variables in the system to a shock in government spending or revenue (not shown for space sake), both shocks account for a large fraction of their own forecast-error variance decomposition, and play a negligible role for the remaining variables. Figure 5 displays the impulse-response functions to a fiscal policy shock in the Fully Simultaneous System approach. The solid line refers to the median response when the system is estimated without imposing the dynamics from government debt, and the dashed lines are, respectively, the median response and the 68 per cent posterior confidence intervals from the system estimated by including the feedback from government debt. The confidence bands are constructed using an Importance Sampling Normalized Weights algorithm based on 50000 draws.
The Fully Simultaneous System Approach
[ Figure 5 ] Figure 5a displays the impulse-response functions of all variables to a positive shock in government primary spending. When we do not take into account the feedback from government debt, one can see that the shock to government spending erodes after four quarters. The effects on GDP are negative -therefore, denoting the presence of "non-Keynesian effects" -and the trough is reached after four quarters. At this horizon, a 3% shock in government spending leads to a fall of GDP of between 0.2% and 0.4%.
As in the case of the recursive partial identification scheme, the impact on the price level is positive, although somewhat less persistent, and there is also a fiscal deterioration as government revenues fall after the shock. In contrast, there is a negative effect on the average cost of debt that reaches its trough after six quarters.
When the debt dynamics is included in the model, the effects of a government spending shock: (i) on GDP are smaller; (ii) become larger in the case of the average cost of debt; and (iii) are somewhat smaller for the price level. Figure 5b shows the impulse-response functions to a positive government revenue shock. The (negative) response of GDP is not lagged, despite being gradual.
The trough is achieved after eight quarters, where a 3% shock in government revenue reduces GDP by about 0.4%. Similarly, the price level does not react with a lag but gradually increases instead, and the effect is very persistent. These pieces of evidence can not be separated from the behaviour of government spending, which increases after the shock, therefore, suggesting a deterioration of public finances. In fact, the average cost of debt is positively impacted, reflecting the less disciplined fiscal policy.
Fiscal shocks and government debt feedback
In this sub-section, we consider the potential debt feedback by estimating the following structural VAR:
Specification (8) is suggested by Bohn (1998) who considers a fiscal reaction function in which d* is the unconditional mean of the debt ratio. In the same spirit, Romer and Romer (2007) suggest that the effect of a tax shock on output may be conditional on the government's aim to stabilize the debt. Therefore, we model the target level of the debt as a constant on the basis of the evidence of stationarity of d.
The estimated coefficients on (d t−1 − d*) in the structural equations of the SVAR
(government spending and government revenue) are reported in Table 2 . We consider the full sample and two sub-samples: 1979:1 -1993:3, corresponding to the period before the Maastricht Treaty entered into force; and 1993:4 -2007:4, thereafter. 0.002 (0.004) Note: standard errors in brackets. *, **, *** -statistically significant respectively at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
In general, the results do not show a significant response of revenue and primary spending to deviations of the debt-to-GDP ratio from its sample average for the full sample. In the first sub-sample (1979:1 -1993:3) , there is some evidence suggesting a weak stabilizing effect that works mainly through government spending: when the debtto-GDP ratio is above its historical mean, government primary spending decreases (the coefficient associated to (d t−1 − d*) is negative (-0.005), although some destabilizing effect then also occurs via the revenue side. In the second sub-sample (1993:4 -2007:4) , the empirical findings show that government revenue plays some stabilizing effect: when the debt-to-GDP ratio is above its historical mean, government revenue increases as the coefficient associated to (d t−1 − d*) is positive (0.006).
Therefore, we can conclude that when faced with high government indebtedness and fiscal imbalances in the Maastricht sub-period, the fiscal stabilization responses have been biased towards increases in government revenue.
A VAR counter-factual exercise
We now conduct a VAR counter-factual exercise aimed at describing the effects of shutting down the shocks in government spending or government revenue. In practice, after estimating the VAR summarized by (1), (2) and (3), we construct the counter-factual (CFT) series as follows:
This is equivalent to consider the following vector of structural shocks ' 0, , , , , ,
where we shut down, respectively in (13) and in (14), the government primary spending and the government revenue unexpected variation and then use the counter-factual structural shocks to build the counter-factual series for all endogenous variables of the system.
This empirical exercise allows us to quantify the magnitude of fiscal policy shocks and its impact on a set of macroeconomic variables. Moreover, it helps us understanding what the dynamics of the economy would be in the absence of unexpected variation in fiscal policy. Figure 6a plots the actual and the counter-factual series for GDP, private consumption, private investment, and government spending in the case of a shock to government spending. Figure 6b displays the actual and the counter-factual series for GDP, private consumption, private investment, and government revenue in the case of a shock to government revenue.
[ Figure 6 ]
The results show that fiscal policy shocks play a minor role as the difference between the actual and the counterfactual series are relatively small. Nevertheless, one can see that in the absence of government spending shocks, private consumption and private investment would have been higher, for instance, in the period 1983-1988 and, more recently, since 2003 . Therefore, such evidence suggests and confirms that unexpected increases in government spending generate relevant "crowding-out" effects, a useful insight to bear in mind when resorting to fiscal instruments to boost the economy.
In the case of government revenue, the difference between the actual and the counterfactual series are negligible, a feature that may be related with the relative size of the government revenue shocks. In fact, while unexpected variation in government spending seems to be large -as follows from the larger differences between the actual government spending and the counter-factual government spending -, government revenue shocks are generally small.
Conclusion
This paper evaluates the macroeconomic effects of fiscal policy in Portugal for the period 1979:1-2007:4, drawing on a new set of quarterly data built from the monthly Central Government's cash data. We identify fiscal policy shocks using: (i) a recursive partial scheme, and estimate a Bayesian Structural Vector Autoregression; and (ii) a
Fully Simultaneous System approach, where we account for the automatic response of fiscal policy to the economic activity. Consequently, the use of such high frequency 20 fiscal data, which is quite valuable from a perspective of monitoring the fiscal position, turns out to be also rather useful from a modelling point of view.
The empirical evidence suggests that government spending shocks: (i) have, in general, a negative effect on GDP; (ii) lead to a fall of both private consumption and private investment; (iii) rise persistently and positively the price level; and (iv) have mixed effects on the average cost of refinancing the debt. More specifically, a 1% positive shock in government spending has a maximum impact on GDP of -0.1%, while "crowding-out" both private consumption and private investment, which fall by 0.12% and 0.2%, respectively.
In addition, government revenue shocks have a negative impact on GDP, on private consumption and on private investment, although the response emerges with a lag of about four quarters. In fact, at this horizon, a 1% positive shock in government revenue is able to generate a positive response of GDP by 0.06%, and an increase of both private consumption and private investment of 0.04% and 0.14%, respectively.
After this, the macroeconomic effects of the tax shock erode and even become negative.
These results suggest that an expansion of government spending is associated to an episode of fiscal deterioration. Similarly, an increase in government revenue is followed by a somewhat less disciplined fiscal policy. This helps explaining the different reaction of the cost of debt to the fiscal policy shock across the two identification methods. Nevetheless, the response of the other macroeconomic variables included in the different frameworks is qualitative and quantitative similar, which gives support to the policy implications of the paper and allows us to be confident on the correct identification of the unexpected variation in fiscal policy.
When we explicitly consider the feedback from government debt, (long-term) interest rates become more responsive, GDP is marginally less responsive, and the effects of fiscal policy on these variables also become more persistent. In addition, the results provide weak evidence of stabilizing effects of the debt level on the primary budget balance.
In a nutshell, it is adequate to say that the results reinforce the idea that fiscal behaviour in Portugal came short of effectively consolidating public finances.
Moreover, expansionary spending shocks have tended to lower real GDP growth. In addition, a VAR counter-factual exercise shows that unexpected spending shocks are responsible for important "crowding-out" effects.
Therefore, the current study provides relevant policy implications, notably from the perspective of the fiscal authorities. Most important is the fact that expansionary fiscal policies in Portugal do not emerge as an obvious instrument to foster economic growth. On the other hand, and from an inflation control point of view, government spending also puts upwards pressure on the price level.
Another significant result, to bear in mind by policymakers when implementing fiscal policy measures in a small open economy as Portugal, is the fact that when faced with high government indebtedness and fiscal imbalances, after the Maastricht Treaty entered into force, the fiscal stabilization responses have been biased towards increases in government revenue. Given the associated excess burden of taxation of such policies and the uncovered crowding-out effect of government spending, it would be advisable to consider designing fiscal policies from a perspective of reducing total government spending. Such approach, when pursued in good times, would contribute to consolidate public finances in a more sustained fashion, while allowing more leeway for an expansionary behaviour in crises, and still within the EU fiscal framework. 
